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IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS
The Costs of an Autonomous Press
by Lee C. Bollinger
In Images of Free Press, 1991 University of Chicago Press, Dean Lee C. Bollinger,
presents what Floyd Abrams has called a "subtly reasoned and powerfully argued attack on
much of the received wisdom about First Amendment theory and law. '' In this excerpt,
Bollinger considers the principle of press autonomy initiated by the country 's seminal libel
case, New York Times v. Sullivan. The case was brought by L.B. Sullivan, an elected commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama, who, while unamed in the challenged articles, said his
reputation had been damaged by published errors. The Court found for the New York Times.
Bollinger argues that while the press autonomy created by Sullivan and its sequels may be
the best system available, much more thought needs to be given to weighing the risks and
costs of the present system.
The idea of journalistic autonomy can be criticized on many different grounds. The
most obvious is that this degree of press freedom requires too great a sacrifice of competing
social interests. This leads us to ask what those interests are and whether the Court has properly assessed them. If it has not, we then will want to know what explains this undervaluation
or misjudgment.
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Let us begin with the most conventional form of criticism of press autonomy. It is
possible to claim - and some have done so - that the Court has purchased press freedom at too high a price of human pain suffered by individuals who, for example, have
their reputations sullied by defamatory statements or by disclosures of private personal
facts. If the price has indeed been too high, one possible explanation might be that
(talcing the libel area) the Court got off to a bad start when it established a general rule
based on the particular facts of Sullivan. Sullivan was surely not a representative libel
case. It seems doubtful that Mr. Sullivan's reputation was seriously damaged by the allegedly false statements in the New York Times advertisement. Indeed, given the time
and the place, it is not inconceivable that his reputation was enhanced by it. It is a commonly observed fact among lawyers that the outcome of a case may depend upon the
special features of the litigants before a court (creating the "central image," as it were,
of what the world is like for purposes of a particular ruling). It is highly desirable,
psychologically, to have a sympathetic client. And when the Sullivan case was called
before the Supreme Court, Sullivan's lawyer must have known he didn't have one. Because not every public official is a Sullivan, it is reasonable to ask whether in adopting
the rules it did covering public debate generally the Court's judgment about the human
costs involved was distorted by the peculiar facts before it at the time.
There is a further sign in the libel case law that this has in fact occurred. The Court
has continued to insist that public officials and figures cannot legitimately complain
about the lack of legal protection against defamatory statements under Sullivan because
they have "voluntarily" chosen to enter the arena of public debate and have, therefore,
"assumed the risk" of nasty commentary. This, however, is an unfair ploy by the
Court, an avoidance maneuver by which it tries to minimize the degree to which we
should care about the pain inflicted under our rules. Essentially, the Court has said
that, since these individuals have freely chosen a public life, what happens to them is
their own doing, just as it is for a man who breaks his leg while hiking in the wilderness. Putting aside for the moment the fact that we also have an interest in encouraging
people to enter public affairs, it simply is wrong to suppose that the pain inflicted by
defamatory statements about public officials and figures is not our responsibility or
concern. It should always be open to people to object to the way the world works under
the rules we create, and not be dismissed by the claim that they have chosen to continue living in that world and, therefore, can be taken as having assented to it.
There are several other examples of the Supreme Court undervaluing the private
costs of press speech. Consider the Court's analysis of the privacy interests at stake
in Cox Broadcasting and Florida Star. The Court there intimated that states had no
serious cognizable privacy interest in preserving the anonymity of rape victims in
the context of the mass media once the information about identity was made available
to any member or segment of the public. The Court thus seemed to indicate that any
disclosure eliminates all privacy interests at stake. But a Court sensitive to the privacy
costs involved surely would have noted that to a normal person there is a great difference between having a humiliating and embarrassing fact recorded in a transcript
housed at the local courthouse and having it become the headline of the local newspaper or television station.
These and similar instances suggest that we should worry about whether the Court
has been sufficiently attentive to the competing human costs wrought by the principle
of an autonomous, unregulated press as it has evolved in recent decades.
But as important as this concern is about the minimization of the private interests
sacrificed to the principle of press autonomy, there are even more serious matters to
worry about. We must also consider how press freedom might, instead of enhancing
public discussion and decision making, actually prove to be a threat to it - a threat to
quality decision making, a threat to democracy, a threat to the very values the First
Amendment (as defined by New York Times v. Sullivan and its successors) is supposed
to further.
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There is no guarantee that the
press will not abuse the freedom
it possesses under the autonomy
model. And there are many ways
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There is no guarantee that the press will not abuse the freedom it possesses under
the autonomy model. And there are many ways in which it might do so. The press can
exclude important points of view, operating as a bottleneck in the marketplace of ideas.
It can distort knowledge of public issues not just by omission but also through active
misrepresentations and lies. It can also exert an adverse influence over the tone and
character of public debate in subtle ways, by playing to personal biases and prejudices
or by making people fearful and, therefore, desirous of strong authority. It can fuel ignorance and pettiness by avoiding public issues altogether, favoring simple-minded
fare or cheap entertainment over serious discussion. Even if the pressures for low-quality discussion come from the people themselves, as to some extent they do, the press
acts harmfully by responding to those demands and hence satisfying and reinforcing
them . It matters not whether the press is the instigator of what is bad or the satisfyer of
inappropriate demands originating in the people. In either case, the press can be an appropriate locus point for reform.
Of course, all these concerns become more serious as the number of those who control the press become fewer, and as more and more members of the general population
turn to a few outlets for information about the world - both phenomena having undeniably occurred in the twentieth century. The value the First Amendment places on
many speakers is not based on a premise that more speakers result in less bias in any
one, rather it is assumed that more speakers mean more people who have a self-interest
in correcting the biases of others, despite the fact that they are biased themselves. As
the number of those who control the gateway to public discussion decreases, this natural corrective is lost. It is, of course, a widely known fact of this century that, for
example, the total number of daily newspapers has declined sharply and that the number of towns and cities across the country with competing papers has been reduced to
a mere handful. Coup~d with this phenomenon is the increased reliance by citizens
on massive media enterprises for information about the world.
These would seem to be the sorts of worries that ought to command our attention.
Shortly after the Second World War there appeared a major report on the condition
of press freedom in the United States. A Free and Responsible Press is a notable document, remarkable for the distinction of its authors, for its willingness to be critical of
the press - and for its neglect by the contemporary world.
Published in 1947, the report was the work of the Commission on Freedom of the
Press, a commission chaired by Robert M. Hutchins, the famous chancellor of the University of Chicago. The commission was formed in 1943, with grants from Time, Inc.,
and Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc ., administered by the University of Chicago. Serving on the commission (in addition to Hutchins) were twelve eminent educators and
public officials including Harold Lasswell (professor of law at Yale), Reinhold Niebuhr
(professor of ethics and philosophy at Union Theological Seminary), and Beardsley
Ruml (chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York). The leading First Amendment scholar of this century, Zechariah Chafee, Jr., served as vice-chairman. The
commission " heard testimony from 58 men and women connected with the press. The
staff has recorded interviews with more than 225 members of the industries, government, and private agencies concerned with the press. The Commission held 17 two-day
or three-day meetings and studied 176 documents prepared by its members or the
staff." Its aim was to study "the role of the agencies of mass communication in the
education of the people in public affairs."
Elegant, intelligent, and concise, the commission's report is as good a statement as
we have of why the press is so important for the quality of our political system and
why its freedom may be in jeopardy due to its inadequacies and abuses.
The report opens with a central question: "Is the freedom of the press in danger?"
"Yes," it answers, and for three reasons:
First, the importance of the press to the people has greatly increased with
the development of the press as an instrument of mass communication. At the
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same time the development of the press as an instrument of mass communication has greatly decreased the proportion of the people who can express their
opinions and ideas through the press.
Second, the few who are able to use the machinery of the press as an instrument of mass communication have not provided a service adequate to the
needs of the society.
Third, those who direct the machinery of the press have engaged from time
to time in practices which the society condemns and which, if continued, it
will inevitably undertake to regulate or control.

•

In the commission's view, it was a sad fact of modern life that, although an "extraordinarily high quality of performance has been achieved by the leaders in each field of
mass communications," when we look "at the press as a whole" we must " conclude
that it is not meeting the needs of our society." Yet the public seemed unaware of this
general failure.
What is needed, first of all, is recognition by the American people of the
vital importance of the press in the present world crisis. We have the impression that the American people do not realize what has happened to them .
They are not aware that the communications revolution has occurred. They do
not appreciate the tremendous power which the new instruments and the new
organization of the press place in the hands of a few men. They have not yet
understood how far the performance of the press falls short of the requirements of a free society in the world today. The principal object of our report is
to make these points clear.
The commission said the problems with the modern press stemmed from the fact
that the nature of the press has changed dramatically, that a "communications revolution has occurred." The central characteristics of that revolution are the concentration
of ownership and control in fewer and fewer hands and the growing dependence of the
public on the press agencies for information about the world. When the First Amendment was adopted, and for many decades thereafter, there were so many outlets that
"anybody with anything to say had comparatively little difficulty in getting it published." "Presses were cheap; the journeyman printer could become a publisher and
editor by borrowing the few dollars he needed to set up his shop and by hiring an
assistant or two. With a limited number of people who could read, and with property
qualifications for the suffrage - less than 6 percent of the adult population voted
for the conventions held to ratify the Constitution - there was no great discrepancy
between the number of those who could read and were active citizens and those who
could command the financial resources to engage in publication." Each publisher could
indulge his or her prejudices, without harm to the public weal, because "in each village and town, with its relatively simple social structure and its wealth of neighborly
contacts, various opinions might encounter each other in face-to-face meetings; the
truth , it was hoped, would be sorted out by competition in the local market place."
But today things are different. The press has become a massive enterprise, slouching
toward monopoly. Even at the time of the commission report, more than forty years
ago, " [n]inety-two percent of the communities in this country, all but the bigger cities,
have only one local newspaper."
The power of the few to reach so many was the product of many converging forces :
the invention of communications technology that increased the size of the reachable
audience; the " advantages inherent in operating on a large scale using the new technology" (what we refer to as economies of scale); the personal interest in power of press
managers; and the practice necessity of very large enterprises to undertake the tasks of
reporting on equally large enterprises, the largest, of course, being the government.
This state of affairs in modern communications could be used for either good or bad
purposes. Intrinsically, it was not one or the other. But to evaluate press performance
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Many forces contending for
control of content steer the
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you have to know what you want. The commission thought we ought to want "first, a
truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent account of the day's events in a context which
gives them meaning; second, a forum for the exchange of comment and criticism;
third, a means of projecting the opinions and attitudes of the groups in the society to
one another; fourth, a method of presenting and clarifying the goals and values of the
society; and, fifth, a way ofreaching every member of the society by the currents of
information, thought, and feeling which the press supplies." Two features of the commission's report should be especially noted here. For the second requirement of a good
press, noted above, it recommended that the "great agencies of mass communications
should regard themselves as common carriers of public discussion." In an ideal world,
it said, there would be "general media, inevitably solicitous to present their own views,
but setting forth other views fairly," and then "[a]s checks on their fairness, and partial
safeguards against ignoring important matters, more specialized media of advocacy."
As to the third requirement, the commission specifically recognized the phenomenon
of the central image and of the press's power to shape it. Mass media, it argued, must
present a balanced and full portrait of groups within the society because "[p]eople
make decisions in large part in terms of favorable or unfavorable images. They relate
fact and opinion to stereotypes.. . . When the images [that the media] portray fail to
present the social group truly, they tend to pervert judgment."
What, then, for the commission, was the level of performance of the press as measured on this scale of values? How close had it come to meeting the needs of society?
Technologically superior, reaching a wider audience, the American press was "less
venal and less subservient to political and economic pressure than that of many other
countries." And the "leading organs of the American press have achieved a standard of
excellence unsurpassed anywhere in the world." But examined as a whole, society's
needs are not being met:

..

The news is twisted by the emphasis on firstness, on the novel and sensational; by the personal interests of owners; and by pressure groups. Too much
of the regular output of the press consists of a miscellaneous succession of
stories and images which have no relation to the typical lives of real people
anywhere. Too often the result is meaninglessness, flatness, distortion, and
the perpetuation of misunderstanding among widely scattered groups whose
only contact is through these media.
Many forces contending for control of content steer the press away from performing its
important social role. The "economic logic of private enterprise forces most units of
mass communications industry to seek an ever larger audience," with the result being
"an omnibus product which includes something for everybody." "The American
newspaper is now as much a medium of entertainment, specialized information, and
advertising as it is of news." "To attract the maximum audience, the press emphasizes
the exceptional rather than the representative, the sensational rather than the
significant."
Many activities of the utmost social consequence lie below the surface of
what are conventionally regarded as reportable incidents: more power machinery; fewer men tending machines; more hours of leisure; more schooling per
child; decrease of intolerance; successful negotiation of labor contracts; increase of participation in music through the schools; increase in the sale of
books of biography and history.
In most news media such matters are crowded out by stories of night-club
murders, race riots, strike violence, and quarrels among public officials. The
Commission does not object to the reporting of these incidents but to the preoccupation of the press with them. The press is preoccupied with them to
such an extent that the citizen is not supplied the information and discussion
he needs to discharge his responsibilities to the community.
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Additionally, the media were continuously exposed to the undesirable and self-serving
pressures of groups within the audience, of their own biases as "big business," and of
advertisers. And by "a kind of unwritten law the press ignores the errors and misrepresentations, the lies and scandals, of which its members are guilty."
The commission stopped short of calling for government regulation. But such involvement clearly was not unthinkable. Freedom of the press, it said again and again,
ought to be viewed as a "conditional right," one extended by society because of the advantages an autonomous press might provide. For press freedom to work, the society
must possess a certain "public mentality" - "a mentality accustomed to the noise and
confusion of clashing opinions and reasonably stable in temper in view of the varying
fortunes of ideas." But while these psychological conditions must exist in the society,
they may be destroyed as well as created by the press itself. Press freedom has, the
commission argued, both "moral" and "legal" dimension, and they need not be coextensive. Although the "moral" right might be "forfeited" through lying or other
irresponsible speech, the "legal" right might still be "retained." Life with a cure may
be worse than life with the disease. Circumstances, however, may change. The "legal
right will stand unaltered as its moral duty is performed." But "(n]o democracy, ...
certainly not the American democracy, will indefinitely tolerate concentrations of private power irresponsible and strong enough to thwart the aspirations of the people."
The commission recommended the self-regulation be tried first. At the time, the
press was engaging in little internal regulation. To have a "profession" is to have a
collective conscience, the commission observed. Yet, unlike the professions of law,
medicine, and divinity, the press had not organized itself to define and cultivate its own
standards. Journalism schools were failing in this, too.
The commission rejected the argument that the press could do no more than meet
the demands of its audience, whatever they may be. "The agencies of mass communication," it argued, "are not serving static wants. Year by year they"'are building and
transforming the interests of the public. They have an obligation to elevate rather than
to degrade them." The root of the dilemma, the commission warned, lay in "the way
in which the press looks at itself." It must view itself as "performing a public service of
a professional kind," and understand that "there are some things which a truly professional [person] will not do for money."
To this general recommendation for self-reform, the commission added a few suggestions here and there, calling in the end for the creation of an independent body,
funded privately, that would investigate and evaluate the performance of the press and
issue reports of its findings and conclusions.
Such was the distinguished commission's analysis of the state of affairs in the postwar press and of what was needed to create both a free and responsible press.
The report of the Commission on Freedom of the Press is not unique in modern
times either in its warnings or in the remedies it proposed. There have been other,
similar reports and critiques. But the commission report is one of the most forcefully
presented, and it reflects the considered judgment of a highly respected group of individuals. It also emerged at the beginning of the post-World War II era, which is of
primary concern here, for that is when the phenomenon of mass communications took
a giant leap forward, when people suddenly became intensely conscious of the potential totalitarian uses of mass communications, and when the Supreme Court itself
began dealing with a variety of government regulations that had a special or exclusive
effect on the press. It was also a time when a major body of social science scholarship
began to develop, one that continues to this day, seeking to understand how news media
"construct" the news, how news production is affected, or skewed, by the economic
structure of the society and the media, by the internal organizational structure of the
media, and by broad cultural forces. It is important to understand how the Supreme
Court addressed and evaluated these concerns about the press as it set about developing
the principle of autonomy.
To inquire into this matter is to confront the surprising fact that in virtually none of
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the major First Amendment cases is there any serious treatment of the kind of concerns
about the performance of the press one sees discussed in the commission report. The
Court's failure to address these matters was not for want of opportunity. Indeed, in
many cases it seems to have gone out of its way - to the brink of misrepresentation to ignore the risk that the press can become a threat to democracy rather than its servant. All things considered, the Court's narrow-minded performance in this respect
seems nothing short of astonishing.
Two areas of the law governing the press that display this tendency of judicial avoidance are libel and privacy. In cases like Sullivan and Cox Broadcasting, it will be
recalled, the Court has treated the costs of speech that is defamatory and invasive of
privacy as purely private, the infliction of pain and suffering on individuals whose reputations in the community are tarnished by falsehoods or truths. The state's interest in
prohibiting such speech is said to derive from the individual interest at stake.
While individual interest in the areas of libel and invasion of privacy should not be
belittled, to conceive of this as the only interest jeopardized by such speech is to ignore
the relevance of other strong social interests in the quality of public discussion. The
Court in Sullivan began to develop an understanding of the psychology of speech behavior that is relevant to thinking about the First Amendment implications of such laws
as those concerning defamation. Recall that the Court offered two competing images
- the image of citizens reluctant to enter politics, and the image of them as uncontrollably aggressive when they do engage in political debate. Yet, despite the fact that the
Court itself assumed these behavior patterns to be common, and despite the belief that
both personality types might produce harmful effects for public discussion and decision making, a situation with ramifications well beyond the mere generation of libelous
remarks, the Court gave no hint of recognition of that dimension of the problem, no
hint of recognition that it might be dealing with an aspect of behavior that could thwart
democracy unless curtailed. One would think that, given the premises about human nature the Court assumed, it would have been alerted to the fact that it was touching upon
deeper and more complex issues.
In cases like New York Times v. Sullivan, therefore, the Court has essentially privatized the injury of speech behavior. But it does not take a great deal of imagination to
discover why a concern with the quality of public discussion and decision making
ought to extend to libelous utterances. We all have an interest in not being misled by
falsehoods, including those about public officials or public figures. Otherwise, good
public officials may be wrongly voted out of office or lose their capacity to persuade
and lead those they represent, and the public may be led to make incorrect political
judgments, all because the press reported a defamatory accusation. Journalism unrestrained by defamation law also may discourage citizens from entering political life,
because they know they will have to bear the risk of libelous falsehoods without recourse against those who, though undeterred now from entering public debate, are
similarly undeterred from making false accusations due to the lack of a potential action
for damages. Those who choose to remain on the sidelines of public affairs may well
be better people than those who become political actors.
No mention of these concerns is to be found in the Court's opinion in New York Times
v. Sullivan, or for that matter in any of its subsequent decisions. In Sullivan itself, the
tremendous power of the institutional press is rhetorically avoided by not mentioning
the press and analyzing the case in terms of the far less menacing image of the "citizen
critic." Even First Amendment analysts sensitive to the need for quality public discussion seem intent on avoiding the issue of the adverse effects on public discussion of
uninhibited defamatory statements.
This neglect of the public interest has also occurred in the Court's limited foray into
the law prohibiting publication of private facts, although here the story is somewhat
more complicated and, in a sense, more interesting. I noted earlier that the Court's
characterization of the cost of this kind of speech has been essentially that it is a matter
of private pain and suffering. Yet, if one returns to the origins of the privacy concept, a

very different analysis is found of the reasons for legal restrictions on privacy invasions. In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis published the first plea for the
creation of a right of action for invasions of privacy. Their essay was not an obscure
law review article when it was published, nor is it now dusty with time and long forgotten. It was widely influential in its own time and even today is often described by many
as the most famous law review article ever written. In it, Warren and Brandeis were
concerned about providing legal redress to those individuals whose privacy was invaded by the publication of personal facts. That is how the Court, in Cox Broadcasting,
referred to it. But Warren and Brandeis also argued that the real destructiveness of the
publication of private facts lay in its impact on social thought. Their condemnation of
this kind of speech on public interest grounds is so powerful that it justifies lengthy
quotation:
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the
vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as
effrontery. To satisfy prurient taste the details of sexual relations are spread
broadcast in the columns of the daily papers. To occupy the indolent, column
upon column is filled with idle gossip, which can only be procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle... . When personal gossip attains the dignity of
print, and crowds the space available for matters of real interest to the community, what wonder that the ignorant and the thoughtless mistake its relative
importance. Easy of comprehension, appealing to that weak side of human
nature which is never wholly cast down by the misfortunes and frailties of our
neighbors, no one can be surprised that it usurps the place of interest in brains
capable of other things. Triviality destroys at once robustness of thought and
delicacy of feelings. No enthusiasm can flourish, no generous impulse can
survive under its blighting influence.
,.
Despite this powerful thesis, the Supreme Court today seems intent on ignoring the
public dimension of the harmfulness of this kind of speech. The costs are regarded as
exclusively private.
Together these cases seem to reveal an important feature of the Court's treatment of
laws governing the press - namely, a strong disinclination to raise and address concerns about the adverse effects of some press speech on the quality of public discussion,
concerns expressed at the beginning of this chapter and described in detail in reports
such as that of the Hutchins commission. In only case, Miami Herald v. Tornillo in
1974, has the Court even referred to such concerns. There it noted the State of Florida's
argument that the circumstances of the press had changed radically since the adoption
of the first amendment: as the Hutchins report had noted , the nation had changed from
a place where newspapers proliferated, and there existed an abundance of available information and opinion to one in which a few giant organizations effectively control the
marketplace of ideas. Guaranteed access for persons criticized by newspapers is, the
state argued, essential to quality public debate. But, though the Court took note of
these concerns, it did not in the end directly address them. It simply concluded that
Florida's law constituted an inappropriate "intrusion into the function of editors."
Why has the Court seemingly been so oblivious to the risks to democracy of a more
or less completely free press? It would be difficult to make the case that the need for
active judicial review has been replaced by a system of collective press self-regulation ,
something the commission strongly recommended. Indeed, in the years since the commission report, there have been very few efforts in that direction. One was the creation
of the National Press Council, the purpose of which was to mediate private complaints
against the press. A wholly private and voluntary affair, the council eventually disbanded because several major newspapers (the New York Times among them) refused to
participate on the ground that to do so would compromise their independence.
The key problem has been with the Court's analytical methods. To minimize private
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injury inflicted by press speech is bad enough, but to treat the injury as an exclusively
private matter is worse. Has the Court done this because it is ignorant of the risks?
Perhaps the Court is itself the unconscious victim of the tendency it observed in the
Sullivan opinion about the distorting influence of our beliefs on the way we understand
the world. Once it decided that the best course was to protect the press, the Court may
have succumbed to the tendency Mill observed (and the Court quoted) to "argue sophistically, to suppress facts or arguments, to misstate the elements of the case, or
misrepresent the opposite opinion."
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